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Last week saw the Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump nominate his vice presidential
candidate in the form of Indiana Governor, Mike Pence; Hillary Clinton will soon announce her own
candidate. Joseph Uscinski writes that the way such vice presidential candidates are selected has
become progressively less democratic, with the process now in fewer and fewer hands. He also
warns that if presidential candidates select a vice president who differs substantially from them in
terms of their policy positions in order to gain electoral advantage, then this can create incentives
for Congress to remove the Commander-in-Chief.
Every four years spectators watch as the presumed American presidential nominees consider and finally choose
their vice-presidential running mates. Donald Trump announced his selection of Indiana Governor Mike Pence last
week; Hillary Clinton is expected to announce her choice following the Republican convention. The media cover the
selection processes as if they were a parlor game, predicting which party can gain an electoral advantage by
choosing which potential running mate.
To increase their chances of winning, presidential candidates often choose vice-presidential candidates who differ
from them in important ways. Trump’s choice of Mike Pence, a social and establishment conservative, was largely
intended to solidify the Republican base by showing deference to the faction of the Republican Party Trump does
not appeal to on his own. Hillary Clinton’s potential choices remain shrouded, but it is likely that the electoral map
and existing divisions in the Democratic Party will factor into her choice.
On one hand, “balancing” the ticket with differing individuals provides a normative value: having a president and
vice president who vary in their positions may deliver broader representation and more balanced governing. On the
other hand, the winning coalition that chose the presidential nominee may not have chosen the nominee’s running-
mate; instead, they would have preferred a vice-presidential candidate more similar to the nominee. Furthermore,
vice-presidents tend to fall into obscurity after the election, and there is no guarantee that the vice-president will
have any say in policy.
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The selection of vice-presidents has fallen into fewer and fewer hands, making it less democratic. Vice presidents
were originally elected by the electorate, but more recently presidential candidates have singlehandedly selected
their running mates with input only from close advisors. This is in opposition to the general trend toward more
inclusivity in US elections.
The undemocratic nature of the selection process has an upside, however. By giving the choice of running mate to
the presidential candidate, the candidate could select a running mate who shares their policy views. This would
provide stable policy and a seamless transition should the president unexpectedly leave office. This is important for
democracy: should the country choose a president offering a set of policy positions for a four year term, they should
be governed by those policy positions for the term’s duration. An unexpected death or removal should not upend
majority rule. But, when presidents and vice presidents differ in considerable ways the country could inherit a leader
espousing policies the country does not democratically support, and beyond this, a perverse set of political
incentives are created.
When a president unexpectedly leaves office, the vice president can put national policy in line with her own
preferences. To reference the Godfather, this creates a “Sonny and Vito problem.” A dissimilarity between the
president and vice president incentivizes assassination as an advantageous way to single-handedly change policy,
and it also incentivizes Congress to remove a president for political rather than criminal reasons. Macabre for sure,
but the incentives for fanatics are real.
Paradoxically, while electoral incentives continue to entice presidential candidates to pick vice presidents different
from themselves, the expected electoral benefits are rarely realized. Some studies show that a vice-presidential
candidate can swing their home state in certain circumstances; however, most research suggests that people vote
for the names on the top of the ticket with vice-presidential candidates having little effect on general election
outcomes.
As we think about Donald Trump’s choice of Mike Pence, or of Hillary’s forthcoming choice, we should move away
from the electoral considerations. Instead, we should focus more on the prospect of succession. Unexpected
succession is not uncommon: nine or one fifth of all US Presidents succeeded because of the death of the sitting
president. Gerald Ford entered the White House after Richard Nixon’s resignation. These ten presidents served a
total of forty-two years. Because of this, we should encourage candidates to pick running mates who can ensure
stability, continuity, and democratic outcomes for the full four years of the presidential term.
This post summarizes arguments in “Smith (and Jones) Go to Washington: Democracy and Vice-Presidential
Selection” published in PS: Political Science & Politics.
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